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EQUAL PAY ACT UPHELD UNDER COMMERCE
CLAUSE: MARSHALL V. CITY OF
SHEBOYGAN
The meaning of the Tenth Amendment' and its relationship to the
commerce clause2 has fostered debate for nearly two hundred years.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in National League of Cities v.
Usery,3 the controversy has intensified as the lower federal courts
struggle to ascertain the scope of the new state sovereignty limitation
on Congress' power to regulate state activities. In Marshall v. City of
Sheboygan,4 the Seventh Circuit recently held that the application of
the Equal Pay Act5 (EPA) to the states and their political subdivi-
sions is a valid exercise "of Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause and that the exercise of that power is not prohibited by the
Tenth Amendment." 6
In Sheboygan, the Secretary of Labor sought to enjoin the City of
1. U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3: "Congress shall have the power ... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes; . . ."
3. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
4. 577 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1978).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). The EPA provides in part:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed,
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of
the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions,. . . Provided, That an employer who is pay-
ing a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to
comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any em-
ployee.
Id § 206(d)(1).
6. 577 F.2d at 6.
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Sheboygan from violating the EPA.7 The Secretary alleged that wo-
men employed as custodians in the city's public schools received a
lower wage rate than men doing essentially the same work.' The city
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings contending the Supreme
Court in National League of Cities had held that Congress lacked the
constitutional authority to regulate the wages which a state or local
government pays its employees.' The federal district court"° denied
the city's motion and certified the case for interlocutory appeal." On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the contention that the Supreme
Court's decision in National League of Cities had specifically ren-
dered all provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act' 2 (FLSA) inap-
plicable to the states. 3
Before ratification of the Constitution, James Madison and Alex-
ander Hamilton expressed differing views about state sovereignty and
the extent of the national government's power in intrastate matters. 14
Their names have come to represent two opposing interpretations of
the Tenth Amendment and its relationship to the commerce clause.' 5
Madisonians argue that the basic governmental organization is a
compact of free and independent states' 6 and that the Constitution
should be construed as allowing federal activity only in strictly inter-
state or international affairs. Hamiltonians, on the other hand, be-
7. Id at 1.
8. Id at2.
9. Id
10. Usery v. City of Sheboygan, 13 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 6383 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
11. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act of 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
13. Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1978).
14. See THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (A. Hamilton); No. 31 (A. Hamilton); No. 39 (J.
Madison). No. 45 (J. Madison); No. 46 (J. Madison). The Federalist was written by
Hamilton, Madison, and John Jay m order to persuade New York to ratify the Con-
stitution but it has often been treated as a "legislative history" of the Constitution.
15. These two theories of the Tenth Amendment are not entirely contrary. Both,
for instance, emphasize that any federal action must be based on the enumerated
powers found in the Constitution. Cowen, What Is Left of the Tenth Amendment, 39
N.C. L. REV. 154, 157 (1961). The courts have used the Hamiltonian philosophy to
promote a strong national government while application of the Madisonian viewpoint
has usually led to increased power for the states. Id See notes 24, 30 and 31 infra.
See generallv Casto, The Doctrinal Development of the Tenth Amendment, 51 W. VA.
L.Q. 227, 227-28 (1949). Note, The Reaffirmation of State Sovereignty as a Fundamen-
tal Tenet of Constitutional Federalism, 18 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 736, 758-65
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Reaffirmation of State Sovereignty].




lieve that the federal government is supreme in its area of delegated
powers and that it has no obligation to preserve any aspect of state
authority in that area. 7
The federalist judges adopted a strict Hamiltonian stance.' 8 In Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland,9 Chief Justice Marshall stated that the powers
of the national government while limited in number are complete. 0
He also indicated that the Tenth Amendment places no restriction on
those powers.2 ' Similarly, in Gibbons v. Ogden,22 Marshall summa-
rily dismissed the idea that the Tenth Amendment might restrict the
commerce power by simply saying that it provided no limitation. 3
After Chief Justice Marshall's death, the Madisonian position was
reasserted and remained predominant throughout the 19th century.24
17. Id
18. Perhaps Justice Story offers the most lucid explication of the position taken by
the Federalist judges on the Tenth Amendment. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1906-08 (1833). Justice Story asserted that
the Tenth Amendment "is a mere affirmation of what upon any just reasoning is a
necessary rule of interpreting the Constitution." Id § 1907. He then noted that when
the Tenth Amendment was before Congress for ratification it was suggested that the
word "expressly" be inserted so that the amendment would read "powers not ex-
pressly delegated" (emphasis in text). The framers pointed out at the time that it was
impossible to confine a government to the exercise of express powers, and that such
an attempt had been one of the most significant defects of the Articles of Confedera-
tion. Cf. ART. OF CONFED. art. 2. Justice Story concluded that the framers of the
Tenth Amendment could not, therefore, have intended "to give it effect as an abridge-
ment of any of the powers granted under the Constitution whether express or implied,
direct or incidental. Its sole design, is to exclude any interpretation by which other
powers should be assumed beyond those which are granted." J. STORY, supra § 1908.
19. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In McCuloch, the State of Maryland sought to
impose a tax on a branch of the Bank of the United States located in Maryland. The
Court held that the state lacked the power to tax or otherwise control any effort by
Congress to carry out any legitimate end enumerated in the Constitution, regardless
of the type of means Congress selects to carry out that end.
20. Id at 406.
21. Id at 405-07.
22. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In Gibbons, the Court considered the question
whether an act by the New York State Legislature giving exclusive navigation rights
on riverways to certain individuals was repugnant to the commerce clause. In decid-
ing that the act was unconstitutional, the Court held that the power to regulate inter-
state commerce, unlike the power to tax, is exclusively vested in Congress.
23. Id at 196-97.
24. The first case to impose a Madisonian interpretation was Mayor of New York
v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837), in which the Court, over a vigorous dissent by
Justice Story, upheld a New York law which required the captains of ships arriving in
New York to provide certain information about each person on board their vessels.
The Court based its decision on the argument that once a ship was in port it became a
[Vol. 19:228
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The Madisonian viewpoint was pushed to its logical extreme during
the Great Depression when it was used to strike down efforts at social
legislation."
In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,26 the Supreme Court
reversed its position on the Tenth Amendment and "substantially ex-
panded the breadth of the federal commerce power over intrastate
matters."27 Chief Justice Stone in United States v. Darby28 demon-
strated the extent of the Court's shift back to the Hamiltonian posi-
matter of purely local concern and as such was out of the realm of Congress' com-
merce power. The state was therefore free to legislate in regard to a ship in port
under its "internal police power." Id at 138.
Later cases fairly consistently reinforced the Madisonian stance. See, e.g., United
States v DeWitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869) (the commerce clause does not give
Congress the authority to regulate the sale or the mixture of chemical substances
within the states); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868) ("in many
articles of the Constitution the necessary existence of the states, and . . . , [the] in-
dependent authority. . , is distinctly recognized. To them nearly the whole charge of
interior regulation is committed or left; to them and to the people all powers not
expressly delegated to the national government are reserved.") (Emphasis added);
Thurlow v. Massachusetts (License Cases), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847) (state laws
requiring licenses for the sale of liquor, even liquor imported from outside the state,
found to be an exercise of police power reserved to the states and not within the scope
of the commerce power). But see Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S.
321 (1903) (Congress can prevent transportation of lottery tickets between two states
even though neither state prohibited the sale of lottery tickets).
25 See. e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294-95 (1936) ("It is no
longer open to question that the general government unlike the states . . . possesses
no inherent power in respect of [sic] 'the internal affairs of the states, and emphatically
not with regard to legislation.' ") (citing Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275
(1918)); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (agricultural production is a strictly
local activity and therefore Congress cannot regulate it under the commerce power);
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (Congress cannot regu-
late the wages and hours of workers engaged in intrastate activities under its com-
merce power); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (manufacturing is a local
operation and, therefore, Congress does not have the authority to prevent transporta-
tion in interstate commerce of articles manufactured by child labor). See generally
Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalirm, 36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950).
26. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In Jones, the Court noted that activities may be entirely
intrastate in character when separately considered. If as a group, however, they have
"such a close and substantial relationship to interstate commerce" that their control is
necessary in order to prevent obstruction of commerce, Congress has the power to
control those activities. Id at 37.
27. Comment, National League of Cities P. Usery.- A New Federalism? 13 URBAN
L. ANN. 169, 171-72 (1977).
28. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). In Darby, the Court upheld the 1938 Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act which provided, among other things, minimum wage and maximum hour




tion when he wrote "the [tenth] amendment states but a truism that
all is retained which is not surrendered." 9 Until 1976, the Supreme
Court uniformly reinforced this view of the Tenth Amendment, re-
gardless of whether the intrastate activity was a part of private indus-
try3" or whether it was state operated. 31
In NationalLeague of Cities,32 the Court adopted a novel interpre-
tation of the relationship between the Tenth Amendment and the
commerce clause. The Court was asked to decide the constitutional-
ity of the 1974 Amendments to the FLSA33 which expanded the Act's
29. Id at 124. The Chief Justice then went on to delineate a line of reasoning
reminiscent of Chief Justice Marshall's position in AMcCulloch:
There is nothing in the history of [the tenth amendment's] adoption to suggest
that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and
state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the
amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national
government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might
not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers....
Id.
30. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding a federal
statute regulating local loan-shark credit activity); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942) (upholding the application of wheat market quotas to a small farmer who grew
wheat entirely for consumption by his own livestock); United States v. Wrightwood
Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942) (upholding a minimum price regulation for milk pro-
duced and sold intrastate).
31. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (upholding the Economic
Stabilization Act. of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, §§ 201-06, 84 Stat. 799, reprinted in 12
U.S.C. § 1904 app., at 586 (1976), which froze wages and prices, including the wages
of public employees, as a constitutional exercise of the commerce power); Maryland
v. Wirtz, 329 U.S. 183 (1968) (upholding the constitutionality of the 1966 amend-
ments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(b), 80 Stat. 830
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1976), extending coverage to employees of public
schools and hospitals); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) ("the States
surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to
regulate commerce"); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946) ("the tenth amendment
'does not operate as a limitation upon the powers, express or implied, delegated to the
National Government' "); Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 526
(1941) ("the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce may be aided by appropriate and needful control of activities and agencies
which, though intrastate, affect that commerce").
32. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
33. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(l),
88 Stat. 58 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1970)). When originally enacted, the FLSA
only covered employees engaged in private industry. Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, ch. 676, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060 (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 203 (1976)). In 1966 Congress expanded the definition of employer to include work-
ers in state or local hospitals and schools. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(b), 80 Stat. 831 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203
[Vol. 19:228
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definition of "employer" to include all nonsupervisory personnel of
the states and their political subdivisions. Justice Rehnquist, writing
for a plurality of four justices, accepted as "beyond preadventure
[sic]" that the commerce clause "is a grant of plenary authority to
Congress,"34 citing with approval35 Hamiltonian language in Darby
and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States.36 Nevertheless, the
Court held that the Tenth Amendment provides an affirmative limi-
tation on the commerce power when Congress seeks to regulate di-
rectly "attributes of sovereignty" essential to a "separate and
independent" state existence.37 The Tenth Amendment barrier only
exists, the Court said, around the "traditional functions of state gov-
ernment." 38 Thus, the underlying principle in National League of
Cities is that the Tenth Amendment restricts regulations promulgated
under the commerce power which are directed at the essential func-
tions of states qua states even though the same regulations may legiti-
mately apply to private activities or nonessential state functions. 39
(1976)). The Supreme Court upheld the 1966 amendments in Maryland v. Wirtz, 329
U.S. 183 (1968). In National League of Cities the Court explicitly overruled Wirtz
when it struck down the 1974 amendments to the FLSA. 426 U.S. at 855.
34. 426 U.S. at 840.
35. Id.
36. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). In Heart of Atlanta, the Court held that Congress has the
power under the commerce clause to prevent a motel from discriminating on the basis
of race in offering accommodations to the public. The Court noted that "the power of
Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate local
incidents thereof," allowing regulation at a motel whose business was "purely local in
character" to the extent that "local" motels as a group have an impact on interstate
commerce. ld at 258.
37. 426 U.S. at 845.
38. Id at 851.
39 While the Court has never before used this line of reasoning in commerce
clause cases, Justice Rehnquist found analogous precedent in intergovernmental tax
immunity cases. Id at 843-45. The concept of federal tax immunity originated in
McCulloch when the Court invalidated a state tax on a branch of the national bank.
Later decisions made the immunity reciprocal. See, e.g., Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (II
Wall.) 113 (1871). The intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine at one time gave all
officials of one government immunity from taxation by the other. Subsequent cases
eroded this protection. See. e.g., Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (permit-
ting state taxation of federal officials), Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938)
(permitting federal taxation of state officials).
In Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell. 269 U.S. 514 (1926), the Supreme Court used a
"necessary functions" test to determine whether the intergovernmental tax immunity
doctrine applied to a state agency. The Court held that agencies "intimately con-
nected with the necessary functions of government" should be granted tax immunity.




Since National League of Cities, a large number of legal scholars40
and a few courts4' have tried to define "attribute of sovereignty nec-
essary to separate and independent existence" and "traditional state
function" in order to determine the scope of the Tenth Amendment
limitation on the commerce power. To a large extent this inquiry has
focused on those provisions of the FLSA not discussed in National
League of Cities, primarily sections of the Equal Pay Act of 1963.42
Many courts, however, have tried to avoid the Tenth Amendment-
commerce clause issue whenever possible, often deciding EPA chal-
lenges on other grounds."3
In Usery v. Allegheny County Institution District,44 for instance, the
Third Circuit held that the EPA could be justified under section five
of the Fourteenth Amendment"5 which gives Congress the authority
to prohibit sex discrimination in employment.46 Two other circuit
seemed to abandon this governmental-proprietary distinction because it "was too
shifting a basis for determining constitutional power." Id at 580.
Justice Rehnquist's reference to intergovernmental tax immunity seems to derive
from the defunct "necessary functions" concept of Metcalf & Eddy. Today, state em-
ployees engaged in "essential state functions" are no more immune from federal taxa-
tion than are people working in private industry or "proprietary" state functions. Fry
v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 554 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally
Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery. New Meaningfor the Tenth Amendment?,
1976 Sup. CT. REv. 161, 177-78; Reaffirmation of State Sovereignty, supra note 15, at
769-73.
40. See, e.g.. Barber, supra note 39; Reaffirmation of State Sovereignty, supra note
15; Comment, 4t Federalisms' Crossroads: National League of Cities v. Usery, 57
B.U.L. REV. 178 (1977); Comment, Applying the Equal Pay Act to State and Local
Governments: The Effect ofNationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 665
(1977); Comment, National League of Cities v. Usery: 4 New Federalism?, 13 URBAN
L. ANN. 169 (1977).
41. See, e.g., Usery v. Edward J. Memorial Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368, 1369 (W.D.
N.Y. 1977) (definitions in National League of Cities must be narrowly construed);
Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 423 F. Supp. 637, 639 (S.D. Iowa 1976)
("[d]iscrimination in pay on the basis of sex is not an attribute of sovereignty").
42. To date at least 34 federal district courts and 5 circuit courts of appeals have
discussed the effects of the National League of Cities decision on the Equal Pay Act.
See Brief for Secretary of Labor at 4 n.5, Marshall v. Kent State University, No. 77-
3284 (6th Cir., filed Oct. 31, 1977) for a partial list of cases.
43. See, e.g., cases cited in note 47 infra.
44. 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. deniedsubnom., Allegheny City Institutional
Dist. v. Marshall, 430 U.S. 946 (1977).
45. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
46. The court found that the Tenth Amendment places no restriction on Congress'
section 5 Fourteenth Amendment power, based on the Supreme Court's decision in
[Vol. 19:228
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courts have followed the Allegheny court's reasoning47 and upheld
the extension of the EPA's coverage to state employees under the
Fourteenth Amendment"8 while explicitly declining to discuss
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). In Fitzpatrick, decided four days after Na-
tional League of Cities, the Court unanimously held that under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment Congress may provide for private suits against states or state
officials which the Eleventh Amendment would otherwise prohibit. The Supreme
Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically designed to apply to the
states, and the state sovereignty arguments proposed in National League of Cities
were. therefore, not relevant.
47, Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 581 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1978)
(applying the EPA to nursing assistants in a county hospital on the basis of the section
5 Fourteenth Amendment power); Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., 558 F.2d
1169 (4th Cir. 1977) (upholding the application of the EPA to public school personnel
as a proper exercise of Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment).
Courts also have upheld the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA). 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1976), which forbids employment discrimination on
the basis of age, as within Congress' power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment In Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977), for instance, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the ADEA to a police department which had re-
fused to hire a 40-year-old man as a patrolman solely because of his age. The court
concluded "that in enacting ADEA and in extending it to the states Congress exer-
cised its powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment" and did not, therefore,
violate the Tenth Amendment. Id at 1270-71. Most district courts have also relied
exclusively on the Fourteenth Amendment argument when faced with the problems
of applying the ADEA to state and local governments. See, e.g., Remmick v. Barnes
County, 435 F. Supp. 914 (D. N.D. 1977) (upholding the application of the ADEA to
local government employees under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment without
reaching the commerce clause issue). But see Usery v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake
City, 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976) (the ADEA may be applied to public employ-
ees under both the commerce power and the Fourteenth Amendment).
48. There are several problems related to upholding the EPA as an exercise of the
section 5 Fourteenth Amendment power. First, the EPA is part of the FLSA which
Congress enacted pursuant to the commerce power. Second, the preamble of the
EPA, Pub. L. 88-38 § 2(b), 77 Stat. 56, reprintedin 29 U.S.C. § 206 app., at 751 (1976),
as well as its legislative history, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., re-
prntedn [1963] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 687, clearly indicates that Congress
intended to enact the EPA under its commerce clause power.
The Allegheny court responded to the first of these arguments by pointing out that
the FLSA is subject to a broad severability provision, 29 U.S.C. § 219 (1976). More-
over, the EPA was enacted as an amendment to the FLSA mainly to allow use of the
existing FLSA administrative procedure. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in 119631 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 687, 688 ("utilization [of the
FLSA] . ,. eliminates the need for a new bureaucratic structure to enforce equal pay
legislation").
The Allegheny court did not address the question of whether Congress' intention to
enact the EPA under the commerce power precluded it from being upheld under the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169




whether the same result might be reached under the commerce
clause.49
The Sheboygan court was the first appellate court, after National
League of Cities, to directly face the question of whether the EPA
could be applied to state and local employees under the commerce
power.5 ° The court emphasized that the prerogative to pay women
employees a lower rate of wages than men performing equal work is
not a fundamental "employment decision." 51 Under the EPA, states
are free to determine all "substantive terms of employment such as
wages, type of compensation or period of employment."52 The only
limitation imposed by the EPA is that whatever substantive terms of
employment the state does decide to implement should "not be deter-
mined arbitrarily or .in a discriminatory fashion."53 The court con-
cluded that the ability to discriminate solely on the basis of sex in the
payment of wages cannot be considered "an attribute of sovereignty
necessary to a separate and independent existence."54
determines the constitutionality of federal legislation, not whether it "correctly
guessed" the particular power needed to adopt a piece of legislation. Id at 1171.
This line of reasoning appears to be a logical extension of the principle that Congres-
sional action should be construed as constitutional whenever possible. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 ("as between two possible
interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the
other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the act").
49. All three courts have strongly implied that they did not believe that the exten-
sion of EPA coverage to state employees could be accomplished under the commerce
clause. In Owensboro-Daviess, the Sixth Circuit, while claiming that it need not reach
the Tenth Amendment-commerce clause issue, nevertheless indicated in a footnote
that "the seemingly definite and inflexible language of the Supreme Court in National
League ofCities. . . would appear to prohibit such regulation, at least as far as em-
ployee wage scales are involved." Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 581
F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (6th Cir. 1978).
50. A number of district courts upheld the EPA as an exercise of the commerce
power prior to Sheboygan. See, e.g., Christensen v. Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D.
Iowa 1976) ar7'd, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977) (applying the EPA to clerical workers at
a state university using commerce power reasoning); Nilsen v. Metropolitan Fair and
Exposition Auth., 435 F. Supp. 1159 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (upholding the EPA as applied
to a political subdivision of a state under both the commerce clause and Fourteenth
Amendment powers); Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 423 F. Supp. 637
(S.D. Iowa 1976) (applying the EPA to public school employees using commerce
power reasoning).





Washington University Open Scholarship
EQUAL PAY ACT
Of equal importance, according to the court, was the fact that un-
like in National League of Cities, where the states had legitimate rea-
sons for not complying with the federal statute,55 the city here had no
legitimate interest to weigh against the EPA.56 The court thus im-
plied that it had used a balancing test to compare the relative state
and federal interests at stake.57
The Sheboygan decision represents an attempt by the federal
courts to narrowly construe the special Tenth Amendment restriction
imposed on the commerce power in National League of Cities.58 The
court simply has not, however, provided a principled basis relevant to
the commerce clause for distinguishing the EPA from the minimum
wage and overtime hour provisions.59
By interpreting "attribute of sovereignty" to allow Congress to reg-
55 In National League of Cities, Justice Rehnquist stated that legitimate reasons
for not complying with the wage and hour provisions included increased expense and
inability either to continue providing essential services or to provide services of the
same quality or in the usual manner. 426 U.S. 833, 847-50 (1976). For example,
California was forced to reduce the length of its training program for state troopers in
order to comply with the overtime hour provisions. Id at 847, and many states would
"'feel" obliged to eliminate programs offering summer employment to juveniles be-
cause of the minimum wage requirement. Id at 848.
56. 577 F.2d at 6.
57 In his concurring opinion in National League of Cities, Justice Blackmun
stated that the Court had used a balancing test in reaching its decision and had
merely found that the state interest had outweighed that of the federal government.
426 U.S. at 855. While the Sheboygan court did not explicitly state that it had used a
balancing approach, its comparison of the relative federal interest in seeking compli-
ance with the city's interest in retaining control over the wages of its public employees
clearly indicates use of a balancing test. 577 F.2d at 6.
58 The National League of Cities decision has not been popular with the lower
federal courts and it has often been given a very restricted interpretation. See, e.g.,
Usery v. Edward J. Meyer Memorial Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368, 1369 (W.D. N.Y.
1977) (the only issue dealt with in National League of Cities was the constitutionality
of the minimum wage and overtime hour provisions as applied to the states); National
League of Cities v. Marshall, 429 F. Supp. 703, 705 (D. D.C. 1977) (Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion in National League of Cities is limited to invalidating the minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions); Christensen v. Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423, 424
(N.D. Iowa 1976), afid, 559 F.2d 1135 (8th Cir. 1977) ("[I]t is the view of the court
that [National League of Cities v User' should be confined strictly to its factual con-
text.").
59. The easiest way to distinguish the EPA from the minimum wage and overtime
provision is to view the EPA as an exercise of Congress' power via section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Paying women lower wages than men raises a clear equal
protection question while equal protection is not an issue when all workers are paid a
substantial wage. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down a state




ulate the wages of city employees engaged in what is admitted to be a
traditional state function,6" the Sheboygan court created an exception
to even the narrowest reading of National League of Cities. Yet the
court does not explain why this exception exists. In terms of the com-
merce power, there is no objective basis for finding that the authority
to pay women lower wages than men is any less an "attribute of sov-
ereignty" than the ability to pay any employee a wage at which he or
she cannot live.6 In either case, regardless of the wisdom of the state
policy, congressional action would impair the states' freedom to
structure the salary level of their employees in areas of traditional
governmental function.
The court's use of a balancing test to weigh the relative federal
interest in seeking compliance with a statute against the state's inter-
est in retaining control of its essential attributes of sovereignty pro-
vides no better basis for distinguishing the facts of Sheboygan from
those of National League of Cities. There exists considerable debate
about whether the language of Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Na-
tional League of Cities rules out the use of a balancing test.62 Even
assuming the validity of the balancing approach, it remains unclear
which values should be afforded greater or lesser weight.63 Without
such guidelines, a balancing test can easily become nothing more
60. Justice Rehnquist did not list public schools among his examples of tradi-
tional state operations, but by overruling Wirtz, which had allowed application of the
FLSA to public schools and hospitals, he clearly indicated that such operations were
among those typically provided. 426 U.S. at 854-55.
61. The practical problems associated with applying the wage and hour provisions
to public employees would also appear to be present with regard to the EPA. The
Sheboygan court admitted that the city might suffer increased costs by having to com-
ply with the EPA (since it cannot lower wages to comply with the Act) but it asserted
that such "impact is minimal when compared to the potential costs of the minimum
wage and overtime provisions." 577 F.2d at 6 n.1 8. The only evidence supplied to
support this assertion, however, was that the city did not claim that compliance with
the EPA would cause it either to raise taxes or release employees. Id Nevertheless,
when applied on a wider scale there seems to be little doubt that compliance with the
EPA would lead to the same increased expenses or curtailment of services problems
caused by the wages and hours provisions.
62. Compare Casenote, National League of Cities .Usery, 54 U. DET. J. URn. L.
617, 635-36 (1977) ("Justice Rehnquist spoke in absolute terms not couching his argu-
ments about balancing interests") with Reaffirmation of State Sovereignty, supra note
15, at 750 (the Court appeared to follow a 'balancing approach,' as recognized by
Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion).
63. This difficulty in determining priorities is due, in part, to the failure of the
Supreme Court in NationalLeague of Cities to explicate any criteria for determining
"an essential attribute of sovereignty" or for determining when a "federal interest is
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than an excuse for judicial supervision of policy judgments usually
left to Congress.64 Nevertheless, the Sheboygan court made abso-
lutely no effort to delineate a set of priority guidelines.
It is not yet clear what view the Supreme Court or the other circuits
will take of Shebovgan. Despite the widespread criticism of National
League of Cities,6 5 preliminary signs do not indicate a general accept-
ance of the Sheboygan reasoning66 and most courts will probably
continue to uphold the EPA as an exercise of the section 5 Four-
teenth Amendment power.6 7 In any event, the decision in Sheboygan
may be seen as an effort by the federal judiciary to reassert the
Hamiltonian view of the Tenth Amendment.
Bradley G. Ka/ka
demonstrably greater" than that of a state. National League of Cities v. User,, 426
U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. See note 58 supra.
66. Since the Sheboygan decision, two additional appellate courts have con-
fronted the issue of whether the EPA applies to public employees under the com-
merce power. In Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 581 F.2d 116 (6th
Cir. 1978), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Sheboygan's commerce clause
reasoning. See note 49 supra. In Pearce v. Wichita County, 590 F.2d 128 (5th Cir.
1979) the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals followed Sheboygan and held that the exten-
sion of the EPA "to the states and their political subdivisions is a valid exercise of
Congress' power under the commerce clause." Id at 132. Thus, to date three circuit
courts have found it necessary to resort to the section 5 Fourteenth Amendment
power in order to uphold the EPA as applied to state employees. See note 46 and
accompanying text supra. Two circuit courts, the Sheboygan court and the Pearce
court, have held that the commerce power will still suffice for this purpose.
67. The section 5 Fourteenth Amendment reasoning will only save a very narrow
range of legislation, and, thus far, it has only been used in EPA and ADEA cases.
Thus, the National League of Cities decision has greatly inhibited congressional ac-
tion on a public sector collective bargaining bill. See Brown, Federal Regulation of
Collective Bargaining by State and Local Employees: Constitutional ,41ternatives, 29
S.C. L. REV. 343, 344 (1977). See, e.g., Nolan, Public Sector Collective Bargaining:
Definng the Federal Role, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 448 (1978) ("[T]he Court's opin-
ion in National League of Cities is not specific enough to insure that . . . any ap-
proach [to a public employee bargaining bill] based on the commerce power, could
survive constitutional attack.").
1980]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol19/iss1/10
